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Abstract
This paper develops a game-theoretic model that explores the use
of costly signals in a litigation environment with private information
held by the plaintiff. I compare the costly signaling model with the
canonical models of settlement through screening (Bebchuk 1984) and
settlement signaling (Reinganum and Wilde 1986), and show that the
costly signaling model compares favorably to these models along several
dimensions, suggesting that it merits further exploration as a tool for
studying suit and settlement. Under plausible conditions, costly signaling (rather than other signaling or screening mechanisms) will emerge
endogenously in litigation, and its results are more robust to changes
in modeling assumptions. I apply the costly signaling model to study
the effects of filing fees and heightened pleading standards, and find
counterintuitive and policy-relevant results: steeply raising the costs
of litigation through filing fees or heightened pleading standards may
lower the total costs of litigation without reducing the number and
size of settlements obtained by plaintiffs; but from a private welfare
perspective, raising pleading standards may hurt plaintiffs even if their
case outcomes are unaffected.

1

Introduction

Most accounts of why parties litigate instead of settle rely on asymmetric information. The canonical models, Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde
∗
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(1986), involve a settlement offer that either “screens” or “signals” a party’s
private information. Yet these canonical model rely on settlement mechanisms
that work just as well out of court as in court: parties can make settlement
offers at any time.
Yet filing a complaint seems to matter. During litigation, the largest number of settlements occur immediately after a complaint is filed, and before any
motion practice or discovery occurs. Boyd and Hoffman (2012) find in a sample
of federal civil lawsuits that about one-third of filed cases settled without any
litigation activity occurring. If the parties had no need for discovery, motion
practice, or trial to settle the case, why didn’t they settle before coming to
court at all?
One answer, and the answer this paper explores, is that the filing of the
complaint itself communicates important information to the defendant, and
this revelation of information precipitates settlement. Imagine a setting in
which potential plaintiffs vary by “type,” whereby a “high type” plaintiff is
one whose claim would, after the time and expense of discovery, generate
a large settlement or trial verdict, while a “low type” is one whose claim
would ultimately yield a smaller return. The plaintiff’s type is initially private
information that is not observable to the defendant—in other words, even if the
plaintiff revealed the information to the defendant, it would not be credible.
An example of this kind of private information is the plaintiff’s degree of
commitment to follow through on the threat to sue, especially for a claim of
modest value. To profess, “No, I really mean it,” does not distinguish the
committed plaintiff from the bluffer. Another example is private information
that goes to the merits of the case, but is not credibly observable outside of
litigation. A plaintiff may lack documentary evidence, but have compelling
testimony. Without a deposition or trial, however, the threat of damning
witness testimony may appear empty or fabricated.
Eventually, of course, the private information will come to light, but only
after considerable cost and delay. After filing of a complaint, discovery, motion practice, and possibly trial, it will be common knowledge whether the
plaintiff was litigious or meek; whether her claim was backed by compelling
testimony or unconvincing puffery; and whether she had the resources to bring
the defendant to its knees or was operating on a shoestring.
But litigation is expensive, and both plaintiffs and defendants would prefer to settle out of court for an amount that reflects plaintiff’s type, rather
than exchange the same payment only after costly litigation establishes the
plaintiff’s type. In this paper, I present a model of pleading in the presence
of asymmetric information in which costly signaling is the key mechanism for
overcoming the information asymmetry. The central feature of this model is
that plaintiffs can control the strength of the signal they send through plead-
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ing or other actions at the very outset of a case.1 The costs of sending a given
signal, however, depend on plaintiff’s type.
This could be for one or both of two reasons. First, if type reflects the
information the plaintiff has pre-litigation, then a plaintiff with lots of favorable
facts both has a higher ex ante probability of prevailing on the merits and a
lower cost of drafting a detailed complaint, if only because the facts needed to
substantiate the claim are already in hand. Second, if type reflects a plaintiff’s
litigiousness or tolerance for risk, a higher (more litigious or risk-tolerant)
type is both more likely to win and more willing to conduct factual and legal
investigation.
As a consequence, types can separate themselves through costly signaling. High types will invest in more detailed complaints, knowing that low
types cannot gain by mimicking such signals of case strength. There are good
reasons why a costly signal might take the form of a legal complaint: Mere
assertions of facts made by the plaintiff in out-of-court negotiations may be
dismissed as “cheap talk” or bluffing. Documenting the same claims in a complaint, however, creates potential legal liability for misrepresentations.2 The
defendant will therefore offer a generous settlement to a plaintiff who sends
a strong signal. Plaintiffs who send weaker signals obtain lesser settlements
commensurate with their type, and plaintiffs with cases that aren’t worth pursuing through discovery and trial will forgo filing suit and sending a signal at
all.
This model adapts to the litigation context the classic Spence (1973) model
of costly signaling in the job market. In Spence (1973), workers invest in
expensive credentials to signal their unobservable skill. The litigation setting
introduces additional complexities absent from basic Spence model: there is
the outside option of trial, and there may be negative-expected value (NEV)
claims that (if identified as such by the defendant) have zero settlement value.
Notably, costly signaling models of this type are rare in the law literature.
Stephenson (2006) applies the concept of costly signaling to the “hard look”
doctrine in administrative law. Cohen and Tabbach (2015) explore costly
signaling in torts context, where potential victims can signal their type to
potential injurers, thereby influencing the degree of care they take. In the
litigation context, Choné and Linnemer (2010) examine costly and observable
1

Other signals might include, for example, retainer of an expensive law firm. For reasons
I describe below, however, pleadings make particularly effective signals of unobservable case
strength. An expensive law firm may be a powerful signal of case strength as well; but
in some circumstances spending more on lawyers may be a sign of weakness rather than
strength. For this reason, I focus on pleadings. Although they serve purposes other than
signaling as well, it is fairly clear that signaling is an important role for pleadings.
2
Allegations in a complaint that are not based on a reasonable investigation and good
faith belief in their validity are a basis for sanctions against both the plaintiff and her
lawyer. See, e.g., Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. §1927, and state ethics rules
for attorneys.
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case preparation, in which effort that increases the strength of the plaintiff’s
case is observable to the defendant. Jeitschko and Kim (2013) model the effect
of a preliminary injunction motion on settlement. Both of these latter articles
consider circumstances in which the signals are sufficiently coarse that the
defendant resorts to a screening strategy in offering settlements even after the
costly signals have been sent. No general model of costly signaling has been
developed for the litigation context.
Fairly general models of litigation have been developed, however, in the
related context of disclosure and discovery. (See Shavell [1989]; Sobel [1989];
Farmer and Pecorino [2005, 2013].) In these models, a party that chooses disclosure or discovery bears an exogenous cost (the other party may bear a cost
as well), at which point the private information becomes common knowledge.
The opportunity to disclose favorable, private information can lead to unraveling if the cost of disclosure is low enough, as every type but the lowest has
an incentive to reveal her private information in order to distinguish herself
from lower types and obtain a higher settlement (Shavell 1989). These models
apply well to the discovery context, where cost is often orthogonal to merits
of the case and discovered information is observable to the parties and usually
verifiable to a court as well.
The costly signaling model that I develop below, in contrast, addresses
a different information setting, one more likely to exist in the pre-discovery
context. The assumption is that the plaintiff’s private information is not
observable to the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff must signal the strength of
the information that cannot be directly disclosed in a credible way.
This information environment is also the context in which the canonical
screening and settlement signaling models are most relevant. Bebchuk (1984)
is the seminal “screening” model. Imagine that the defendant has private
information about the strength of her case—it can be strong (the defendant is
a “high type” with a high chance of winning) or it can be weak (the defendant
is a “low type” with a low chance of winning). The plaintiff makes a single,
take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand and goes to trial if the defendant rejects
it. The screening strategy is to demand a large settlement, one that represents
the maximum amount that the low type defendant is willing to accept. The
low types accept this settlement offer, while the high types reject the offer in
favor of trial. In this way, the plaintiff’s demand “screens” out the low types,
and we observe a mixture of settlement and litigation in equilibrium.
Reinganum and Wilde (1986) present the seminal “settlement signaling”
model.3 In this model, the party with private information makes a single
take-it-or-leave-it offer and, if the other party rejects it, litigation ensues. If
3

The Reinganum and Wilde (1986) model is widely known as the canonical “signaling”
model. To avoid ambiguity, and because the settlement offer itself conveys the signal of
private information, I will call this model the “settlement signaling” model. In contradistinction, I will refer to my model as the “costly signaling” model.
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the plaintiff has private information, then in equilibrium high types offer high
settlements and low types will offer more modest settlements. Defendants
always accept the lower settlements. Defendants only accept larger settlements
with a probability less than one.4 The plaintiff’s settlement offer is a signal of
her type, and these offers induce a mixture of settlement and litigation.5
The “costly signaling” model I describe herein, like the Bebchuk (1984)
screening model and the Reinganum and Wilde (1986) settlement signaling
model, provides a simplified representation of pre-trial settlement bargaining
that both attempts to account for stylized facts about litigation and facilitate
normative analysis. In this paper, I introduce the costly signaling model,
describe its equilibrium, and explore its implications.
In Section 2, I present the costly signaling model in an informal way, using an example with three plaintiff types. Readers who are familiar with
the Spence (1973) model may want to skip this section, as the analysis is a
straightforward application of textbook treatments of the Spence model.
In Section 3, I present a formal version of the model which includes a
continuum of plaintiff types and discusses equilibria both with and without
the presence of NEV claims. NEV claims present a special challenge to the
use of costly signaling to reveal types, because in equilibrium all plaintiffs
with PEV claims receive settlements, but no plaintiffs with NEV claims do.
The need for positive-expected-value (PEV) types to separate themselves from
NEV types dramatically raises signaling costs.
In Section 4, I compare costly signaling to screening and settlement signaling, assessing their likely empirical relevance and normative desirability. In
the course of this analysis, I tease out several distinctive and novel results:
The cost advantage of costly signaling. Canonical models of screening and
signaling rely on settlement offers to screen or signal plaintiff type. Settlement
offers, of course, have no inherent cost. But these mechanisms for settlement
necessarily entail substantial costs in equilibrium, as the separation of plaintiffs
types is achieved by forcing some cases to go to trial. This imposes the costs
4

This is the result of the incentive compatibility conditions for equilibrium. While the
settlement amount reveals the plaintiff’s type, the defendant cannot accept the large settlement offer with a high probability, or else the low-type plaintiffs will find it profitable to
mimic the high types by offering large settlements as well.
5
As will become relevant when I compare costly signaling to these models, it is worth
noting that Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) simply set aside NEV claims,
but later work has dealt with the complexities that emerge once potential plaintiffs include
those with NEV claims. Farmer and Pecorino (2007) addressed the possibility of NEV claims
in the Reinganum and Wilde (1986) signaling model, showing that a separating equilibrium
is only possible when filing is costly, and the presence of NEV claims lowers the probability of
settlement for all claims in equilibrium. For the screening model with uninformed plaintiffs,
Nalebuff (1987) extends the Bebchuk (1984) analysis to allow for some plaintiffs to have
NEV claims. More applicable here is Katz’s (1990) analysis, which considers a screening
equilibrium in an environment where the plaintiff has private information, and the number
of frivolous claims is endogenously determined.
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of discovery and trial on both parties. Costly signaling, which entails up-front
expenditures but avoid the costs of discovery, may therefore be less costly. I
show that under some plausible assumptions “costly” signaling entails lower
total costs than its alternatives.
Comparison of models. Daughety and Reinganum (1993) present a model
that nests a settlement signaling model and a screening model, which allows
them to predict which form of settlement mechanism will (as a positive matter)
arise endogenously and which is (as a normative matter) preferable from a social welfare perspective. In this paper, I incorporate costly signaling, screening,
and settlement signaling into a single analysis. As I will show, under a range
of plausible conditions, costly signaling, rather than screening or settlement
signaling, will arise endogenously and/or will maximize social welfare. Thus,
costly signaling is likely to be empirically relevant and normatively attractive
as a settlement mechanism.
Robustness to bargaining dynamics. Most of the relevant literature examines a settlement process exogenously fixed to involve a single, take-it-or
leave-it settlement proposal by a single party who holds all of the bargaining
power (i.e., the party captures 100 percent of the surplus from settlement).6
Yet the ability for settlement offers to act as signals or screens depends heavily
on this assumption which may not be a suitable abstraction of reality.7 Costly
signaling, in contrast, depends on no assumptions about the bargaining process.
Attention to real-world information environments. As Hause (1989) points
out, most models of asymmetric information do not account for the reality
of pretrial procedure, in which the discovery process exists precisely in order
to eliminate asymmetries of information between the parties.8 Given this,
while canonical models refer to the choice between “settlement” and “trial,”
they are better understood as models of the a choice between “settlement”
and “discovery.”9 The costly signaling model focuses on capturing observed
patterns of behavior associated with the early stages of a dispute such as
6

See, e.g., Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Shavell (1989), Sobel (1989),
and Farmer and Pecorino (2005, 2013).
7
Without this assumption, the behavior in these models is not sequentially rational, i.e.,
subgame perfect. A plaintiff whose screening settlement offer is declined would update her
beliefs about the defendant’s type and then offer a lower settlement. But of course this
destroys the ability of the first offer to successfully screen types; defendants will refuse the
first offer because the second offer will be more generous. Nonetheless, these models have
empirical relevance if, in practice, parties can credibly commit to make only one settlement
offer and credibly commit to refuse offers even when it not sequentially rational to do so.
8
“The rules of pretrial discovery limit the empirical importance of the kind of asymmetry
that these articles [Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986)] assume.” Hause
(1989).
9
Other articles, however, such as Spier (1992), Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009), and
Farmer and Pecorino (2013), are explicit in characterizing themselves as models of pre-suit
or pre-discovery settlement.
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retention of counsel, complaint drafting, and pre-discovery litigation strategy.10
Application to pleading. I show how costly signaling may characterize
pleading practice, and how minimum pleading standards may effectively set a
floor on signal strength among filed cases. Heightened pleading standards may
reduce the social costs of litigation—without reducing the volume of litigation.
This social benefit comes at a distributional cost, however: raising pleading
standards may raise costs for all plaintiffs, even those whose pleadings would
easily clear the bar, regardless of standard.11

2
2.1

Informal Treatment with Discrete Types
Basic Model and Results

Take a dispute between a plaintiff and a defendant, in which the plaintiff
may be one of three types, H, L, and N EV , corresponding to high-value
claims (H), low-value claims (L), or negative-expected-value claims (N EV ).
High settlement value may come from the plaintiff’s claim being high merit,
having a high damages claim, or the plaintiff simply being especially dogged or
litigious and thus better at extracting a higher settlement from the defendant.
The plaintiff’s type cannot be directly observed by the defendant, but the
distribution of types is common knowledge.
Plaintiffs can spend resources to send a signal to the defendant. This signal
could take the form of a long and detailed complaint based on an intensive
pre-filing investigation. With this example of a costly signal in mind, I label
the strength of the signal A (for “allegations”), such that a higher value of A
reflects higher expenditure by the plaintiff.
The cost of generating a signal of strength A is not the same for high types
and low types. High types find it less costly to collect additional facts or law to
include in their pleadings or to otherwise send a stronger signal. This could be
because their claims are higher merit (they have more favorable facts already
on hand), they have higher damages (plaintiff’s private information contains
ready evidence of injury), or plaintiff suffers less disutility from gathering otherwise unavailable evidence (a litigious plaintiff may not mind spending time
preparing for litigation).
Thus, even though claim strength is not directly observable until after
discovery (which itself is costly), high-type plaintiffs can avoid the cost of
discovery by sending a strong signal to the defendant. Although a strong
10

In contrast, the choice to proceed to “trial” occurs in an environment of (nearly) symmetrical information. As such, trial per se may be better explained by divergent expectations
models, such as Priest and Klein (1984), rather than models of asymmetric information.
11
See Hubbard (2016b) for analysis of the effect of pleading rules in a symmetricalinformation environment.
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signal may be expensive for high types, it is prohibitively costly for low types,
and thus the signal reliably reveals the plaintiff’s type to the defendant. The
defendant can then settle with the high type for a high amount.
Equilibrium in this costly signaling game is illustrated by Figure 1.12 The
horizontal axis measures signal strength, and the vertical axis measure settlement amount. The curves are indifference curves for the three types. They
show that as a party sends a stronger (and thus more costly) signal, the party
must be able to obtain a larger settlement in order to cover the cost of the
signal.13 Note that the low types have steeper indifference curves: their costs
of signaling rise quickly, making it difficult for them to send a strong signal.
High types’ indifference curves are flatter: their marginal cost of sending a
stronger signal is lower. In this illustration, I assume that the parties have
equal litigation costs and equal bargaining power, and thus a defendant who
knows that a plaintiff has a claim of value H will offer a settlement of H, which
the plaintiff will accept.
The equilibrium is as follows: The low types must separate from the NEV
types, and the high types must separate from the low types. We see that the
NEV plaintiffs do not sue and do not signal; they obtain zero. This is because
revealing their type would reveal that they have no credible threat to sue.
Thus, they can only obtain a positive settlement by mimicking a low type or
a high type. But low types do not want to pool with NEV types; they can
obtain a higher settlement by separating themselves. Thus, low types file suit
and send a signal that is just strong enough to ensure that the NEV types do
not mimic them. Because the low types’ signal uniquely reveals their type,
they receive a settlement of L. The low types’ signal (AL in the figure) is such
that it would cost L for the NEV type to send this signal.
Since mimicking the low types yields a settlement of at most L, NEV types
gain nothing from mimicry. They do not sue, do not signal, and receive nothing
in settlement.14 Similarly, the high types send a costly signal to separate
themselves from the low types. They receive a settlement of H. To ensure
that low types do not mimic them, the high types’ signal is such that raising
their signal from AL to AH would cost the low types H − L. Thus, low types
gain nothing from mimicking high types.
The equilibrium in Figure 1 fully separates each type of plaintiff. While
12

Equilibrium definition and derivation is standard and can be found in any textbook
treatment of costly signaling with discrete types. See Bolton and Dewatrapoint (2005).
Below, I provide a formal treatment of the model with continuous types, which addresses
features not addressed in the canonical Spence (1973) model, such as NEV claims and
outside options.
13
Formally, the indifference curves are vertically shifted versions of the plaintiff’s cost
functions F (t, A), where F is the cost to type t of sending signal A.
14
Implicit here is the assumption that a party who is indifferent between filing and not
filing with not file. This is realistic, given that parties face a low, but positive, filing fee in
court.
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one might imagine a pooling or semi-pooling equilibrium (i.e., an outcome
in which all types, or some subset of different types, send the same signal),
no such equilibrium will be stable.15 In an equilibrium where different types
sometimes or always send the same signal and receive the same settlement
reflecting the (weighted) average value of their claims, relatively higher types
will have an incentive to deviate, send a stronger signal, and receive a higher
settlement reflecting the value of their claims.16 This is commonly referred to
as “unraveling.”

2.2

Application: Heightened Pleading Standards

As noted above, one of the forms that costly signaling may take is a presuit investigation, perhaps by an expensive law firm, that is documented in a
complaint that includes factual details of the plaintiff’s pre-suit efforts as well
as legal argumentation reflecting effort spent on legal research. How well does
the model represent the filing and pleading decision? There are two obvious
considerations here. First, the basic model has no filing fee or other fixed cost
to filing. Given that actual filing fees are very small relative to other litigation
costs, though, it is realistic to omit filing fees from the model but assume that
a plaintiff who sends a zero signal strictly prefers not to file a complaint, and
thereby save the small filing fee.17 This is exactly what the model does.18
Second, the model above does not incorporate pleading standards.19 Thus,
there is no minimum requirement of detail for a complaint before the plaintiff
has a credible threat to take the case forward to discovery. This is a rough
approximation of state of federal law at least until 2007; the regime of “notice
pleading” included no express requirement that the complaint contain any
evidence that the plaintiff’s claim had positive settlement value.20
15

More precisely, by “stable” I mean that a pooling or semi-pooling equilibrium would
fail the “Intuitive Criterion” for equilibrium selection. See Cho and Kreps (1987).
16
In the discussion of the model with continuous types below, I discuss these criteria for
equilibrium in more formal terms.
17
To file a civil suit in federal court, the plaintiff must pay a total of $400 in fees. See
28 USC §1914 (setting a $350 filing fee for a civil action in US district courts); District
Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Aug
20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9LR-4LVZ (setting a $50 administrative fee for
initiating a civil action in US district courts).
18
In Section 4 I will consider the implications of higher fees.
19
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) governs the content of a complaint: “A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”Once a plaintiff files a complaint, the
defendant can file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted” under Rule 12(b)(6). A complaint that fails to meet the pleading standard set by
Rule 8(a) will be dismissed. Thus, a complaint must meet the applicable pleading standard
in order for the plaintiff to have a credible threat to advance the litigation to discovery.
20
The “notice pleading” standard is often also called the “Conley” standard, after Conley
v. Gibson (355 U.S. 41, 45-46 [1957]).
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Since 2007, however, there arguably has been a heightened pleading standard in federal court, one which requires all complaints to contain costly signals
of the strength of the plaintiff’s claim. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
(550 U.S. 544, 557 [2007]), the Supreme Court required that a complaint plead
facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” the plaintiff’s legal
claim.21 This new pleading regime is known as “plausibility pleading.”
With this in mind, we can treat this baseline model as a model of costly
signaling in the pre-Twombly pleading regime. The model predicts that filed
complaints will contain costly signals of case strength, even though there is
no legal requirement to do so. Empirically, this was the case. Even before
Twombly, most complaints were fairly factually detailed. Marcus (1986) and
Fairman (2003) document the persistence of “fact pleading” by courts and
litigants despite decades of practice under the notice pleading standard; Hubbard (2016a) provides further discussion and examples. Of course, there are a
number of reasons why “fact pleading” may have occurred pre-Twombly, and
surely various factors contributed. Some judges may have applied a heightened pleading standard even under Conley; and detailed pleading’s signaling
benefits may have extended beyond settlement.
The model also predicts that filing a complaint itself will be sufficient to
induce settlement, even if nothing else happens in the litigation. The costly
signal is enough to eliminate the information asymmetry. Empirically, while
there is hardly a 100 percent settlement rate after filing, a surprisingly large
share of cases settle after a complaint is filed but nothing else has happened
in the case. As noted above, Boyd and Hoffman (2012) found that about onethird of filed lawsuits are settled without any litigation activity occurring—no
motions, no discovery. (Below, the expanded version of the model, which
allows for two-sided private information, accounts for both the high rate of
early settlement and the fact of trials.)
Further, the model offers insights about the effects of heightened pleading
standards, if we incorporate a pleading standard into the model in the form of
a minimum level of costly signaling required for every a filed complaint (call
this Ā). Such a requirement can have quite different effects depending on how
high the standard is set. There are three possible effects that can occur as the
pleading standard rises:
Case 1: There could be no effect whatsoever. This happens, for example,
in the range 0 ≤ Ā ≤ AL in Figure 1. The NEV types do not send signals
regardless, and the low types send a signal of strength AL . Thus, raising the
standard Ā has no effect on the equilibrium.
Case 2: All types that file complaints could increase the strength of their
signals. This happens when the pleading standard become a binding constraint
21

The Supreme Court reaffirmed Twombly almost exactly two years later in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal (129 S. Ct. 1937 [2009]), stating that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” (Id. at 1949-50.)
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for the lowest type that still files suit. For example, as the standard Ā rises
above AL , it is still worthwhile for low types to sue, but they now must send
a stronger signal in order to satisfy the pleading standard. Because low types
are sending a stronger signal, high types must send a stronger signal as well
to maintain sufficient separation in terms of signal cost. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Case 3: if the standard rises high enough, some or all types may abandon their
(otherwise PEV) claims. This happens when a type would no longer have a
net positive payoff from signaling, revealing her type, and then obtaining a
settlement reflecting her type. Figure 3 illustrates this. When the pleading
standard reaches the threshold Ā¯, the cost of meeting the pleading standard
exceeds the settlement that the low-type plaintiff can obtain. Thus, low types
drop out of litigation, and only high types remain. Note, though, that even in
this situation, high types engage in very costly signaling in equilibrium, lest
low types mimic them to obtain a high-type settlement.
This model thus provides a straightforward way to reconcile two competing
narratives about plausibility pleading: first, that it has harmful effects on a
large number of plaintiffs; and second, that it has had essentially no effect on
case outcomes. Depending on which of the three cases above describes the
effect of plausibility pleading, one or the other or both of these narratives may
be true. In Case 1, there are no effects at all—no effect on case outcomes and
no harmful effects on plaintiffs. In Case 2, there are no effects on case outcomes
(every plaintiff still files and settles) but all plaintiffs are worse off. In Case
3, case outcomes change dramatically because some plaintiffs who would have
received settlements get nothing.
Notably, a fair amount of empirical data suggests that Twombly and Iqbal
may have impacted at most a small share of all case outcomes, such as filing
rates, dismissal rates, and overall termination rates. Estimates of the share of
cases whose outcomes were affected by Twombly or Iqbal are almost universally
not statistically different from zero; in some cases the estimates of zero are
quite precise; and when statistically different from zero, the estimates are in
the range of 1 percent of all cases (see Hubbard 2016c for a survey and further
evidence). But there is evidence that pleadings may have become more detailed
(and presumably more expensive to prepare) since Twombly. (See Hubbard
2016c.)
This evidence is consistent with Twombly raising the pleading standard to
a point near AL —for example, Ā in Figure 2. In this scenario, no plaintiffs are
deterred from filing, and all plaintiffs obtain the same settlements as before.
But because all plaintiffs send more costly signals in equilibrium, all plaintiffs
with PEV claims are made worse off.
Of course, the basic model does not capture all the key stylized facts for
civil litigation, such as the fact that many case don’t settle. And of course,
factors other than costly signaling are at play when parties decide to plead
11
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or take other observable actions early in a dispute. Up-front investments
in lawyers and pleadings, for example, can save costs later in litigation and
improve a plaintiff’s chances of success at trial. I consider these extensions
in the Appendix. Importantly, these considerations do not affect the central
results here.

3

Formal Model with a Continuum Types

In this section I present a formal model of costly signaling with a continuum of
plaintiff types. The qualitative results above continue to hold, but the richer
(and I think more realistic) model permits additional insights, including comparison with canonical models of settlement and consideration of mechanisms
that could encourage less socially costly patterns of settlement and litigation.
Take a dispute between a plaintiff and a defendant, in which the plaintiff
has type t, but her type is unobservable to the defendant. Plaintiffs of different
types differ in two ways. First, plaintiff type t ∈ [t, t̄] reflects the plaintiff’s
expected judgment, accounting for her probability of prevailing on the merits
and the amount of her claim. Second, higher types find it less costly to generate
a signal that is observable to the defendant.
The plaintiff can send a signal of strength A at a cost of F (t, A), such that
F (t, 0) = 0 for all t. I assume that FA (t, A) > 0, FAA (t, A) ≥ 0, Ft (t, A) ≤ 0,
and FtA (t, A) < 0 for all t and all A. These conditions reflect the fact that it is
easier for higher types to send stronger signals than lower types.22 Although
this model applies to signals generally, for concreteness I will sometimes refer
to the signal A as “allegations” and the cost F (t, A) as the “filing cost” for
type t to file a complaint with allegations A. In addition to the endogenously
determined cost of drafting allegations, the court may also impose a fixed filing
fee C0 .
After the plaintiff has an opportunity to signal, the parties have an opportunity to settle. For simplicity, I allow only a single, take-it-or-leave-it offer,
but allow for bargaining power to vary by having the plaintiff capture a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus generated by settlement. This means that the
plaintiff who reveals her type through costly signaling will obtain settlement
amount S(t) = t + αCD − (1 − α)CP . With equal bargaining power (i.e.,
α = 0.5) and equal litigation costs, this is simply S(t) = t; the defendant
pays the plaintiff the expected value of the plaintiff’s claim. To make this
model comparable to the canonical model of settlement signaling (Reinganum
and Wilde 1986), one can assume that the plaintiff has all of the bargaining
22

These conditions are sufficient but not necessary for the results below. Although not
strictly necessary, these conditions are simple and make intuitive sense. For example, while
it is not necessary that, for the same signal strength, higher types always have lower costs
than lower types, it is not obvious why they wouldn’t.

12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947302

power (i.e., α = 1). Importantly, this setup, although it takes the form of a
single offer, does not place strong restrictions on the bargaining process. All
it requires is that, in a setting where type is revealed, the parties settle for
an amount no less than the expected trial outcome minus plaintiff’s discovery
costs (i.e., plaintiff’s reservation amount) and no greater than the expected
trial outcome plus defendant’s discovery costs (i.e., defendant’s reservation
amount). Varying bargaining power α allows the parties to reach any settlement in that range. Obviously, this is a very weak restriction on the outcome
of the bargaining process, regardless of specific nature of the process.23
If the parties do not settle and the plaintiff has a credible threat to go
to discovery, the parties bear litigation costs CP and CD , respectively. The
plaintiff recovers in expectation the amount t after discovery. For simplicity, I
assume that the parties will settle rather than litigate if settlement yields an
identical payoff to litigation.

3.1

Results without NEV claims

I first present results for the scenario where there are no NEV claims.
Proposition 1: Equilibrium in Absence of NEV Claims. Assume that
all plaintiffs are willing to file suit (i.e., C0 is not too high) and that all plaintiffs
have a credible threat to proceed to discovery after filing suit: t ≥ CP . Assume
further that (at least in equilibrium) the cost of discovery is greater than
the cost of signaling.24 There is unique, perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
that satisfies the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987). This
equilibrium has the following elements:
Settlement offers and responses. The defendant offers S(A∗ (t)) = t + αCD −
(1 − α)CP . Offers are always accepted.
Signaling strategy. The equilibrium signaling schedule A∗ (t) is such that each
type reveals itself by sending a unique signal and no type can increase its payoff
by mimicking the signal of a different type. The signaling schedule A∗ (t) is
defined by an optimality condition and a boundary condition.
The optimality condition is
FA (t, A∗ (t))

dA∗ (t)
=1
dt

23

(1)

As a consequence, this formal model can represent bargaining with any number of offers
and counter-offers. For example, it is equivalent to an alternating offer game with unlimited
opportunities to make offers and counteroffers, in which the plaintiff and defendant have
per-period discount factors δP and δD , respectively, such that δD = (1 − α)/(1 − αδP ).
(See Rubinstein [1982] for the canonical treatment of the alternating offer game.) For
δP = δD → 1, α = 0.5.
24
This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.
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This equation reflects the optimality condition for a separating equilibrium:
each type t maximizes her payoff by sending a signal A∗ (t) that uniquely
corresponds to type t. The left side of Equation (1) is the marginal cost of
mimicking a higher type; the right side is the marginal benefit (mimicking
a one-dollar-higher type yields a one-dollar-higher settlement). Put another
way, Equation (1) represents the (binding) incentive compatibility constraint
in this model.
The boundary condition reflects the fact that the lowest type need not
signal at all:
A∗ (t) = 0

(2)

Posterior beliefs. The defendant’s posterior beliefs about plaintiff’s type β(t|A)
in this equilibrium are β(t|A∗ (t)) = 1 and β(t|A∗ (j)) = 0 for all j 6= t.
Proof. See the Appendix for derivation of this equilibrium.
Remark. While there are many PBEs that one may propose, I will focus on
the equilibrium described above, which is the “least-cost separating equilibrium,” the unique, pure-strategy, separating equilibrium that minimizes the
social cost of costly signaling. Equation 1 ensures that it is a separating equilibrium, and Equation 2 ensures that separation occurs at the lowest possible
cost.
It is also the only PBE that also satisfies the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion
(Cho and Kreps 1987). The Intuitive Criterion rules out any pooling equilibrium, because such equilibria would not be stable. In any pooling PBE with
pooling signal AP ool , higher types will have an incentive to deviate by choosing
A(t) > Apool in order to reveal their type and obtain a higher settlement. I
focus on this equilibrium selection criterion because of its empirical plausibility: out-of-equilibrium, it seems “intuitive” that real-world defendants would
infer that a costlier signal is a sign of a higher-type plaintiff (rather than the
opposite). I consider pooling in greater detail in Section 3.3, below.
Remark. Note that in the costly signaling model, the costs of signaling
represent all of the costs of litigation in equilibrium. Because the parties
never proceed to discovery, the parties incur no other costs.
Remark. While the model places no upper bound on signal strength, it may
be more realistic to assume that beyond a point, a complaint cannot convey
further case strength. For example, a plaintiff with a case so strong that
she can rule out every conceivable defense or counterargument may have no
practical way to signal such information. If there is a maximum signal Ã,
then the results above hold for all plaintiffs for whom A∗ (t) ≤ Ã. Define t̃
such that A∗ (t̃) = Ã. Plaintiffs just above that threshold (all types t such
that t̃ < t ≤ S(A∗ t̃) + CP ) will plead with signal Ã and receive settlement
S(A∗ (t̃)); in other words, they will mimic type t̃. Plaintiffs with the highest
14
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types (t > S(A∗ t̃) + CP ) will forgo signaling and proceed straight to discovery.
Even after paying the costs of litigation, these highest types gain more from
litigation than settlement. See Figure 5 for an illustration.

3.2

Results with NEV Claims

I now present results for when some claims are NEV claims. The presence
of NEV claims slightly complicates the analysis, because in any sequentially
rational equilibrium, the defendant will refuse to settle with a plaintiff who
reveals herself to be a type with a NEV claim. Whenever α > 0, such that
the plaintiff captures some of the surplus from settlement, the presence of
NEV claims creates a sharp discontinuity between the settlements paid to the
“cutoff” (zero-expected value) type and types just below it, which means that
NEV types will have a strong incentive to mimic the marginal type in order
to obtain a strictly positive settlement. For a separating equilibrium to be
incentive-compatible, therefore, the cutoff type must have a zero payoff.
Proposition 2: Equilibrium with NEV Claims. Assume that (at least
in equilibrium) the cost of filing suit and conducting discovery is greater than
the cost of filing suit with costly signaling. There is a unique, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) that satisfies the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion (Cho and
Kreps 1987). This equilibrium has the following elements:
Settlement offers and responses. To plaintiffs sending signal A∗ (t) ≥ A∗ (CP ),
the defendant offers S(A∗ (t)) = t + αCD − (1 − α)CP . To plaintiffs sending
signal A < A∗ (CP ), the defendant offers S(A) = 0. Offers are always accepted.
Signaling strategy. The equilibrium signaling schedule A∗ (t) is such that (1)
each type at or above the cutoff type t = CP reveals itself by sending a unique
signal, (2) each type below the cutoff type t = CP sends a zero-cost signal,
and (3) no type can increase its payoff by mimicking the signal of a different
type. The signaling schedule A∗ (t) for all t ≥ CP is defined by an optimality
condition and a boundary condition. The optimality condition is
dA∗ (t)
=1
FA (t, A (t))
dt
∗

(3)

The boundary condition reflects the fact that the cutoff type must have
payoff equal to zero:
S(CP ) − F (CP , A∗ (CP )) = 0

(4)

Posterior beliefs. The defendant’s posterior beliefs about plaintiff’s type β(t|A)
in this equilibrium are β(t|A∗ (t)) = 1 and β(t|A∗ (j)) = 0 for all t, j ≥ CP and
j 6= t, and β(t < CP |A < A∗ (CP )) = 1 and β(t < CP |A ≥ A∗ (CP )) = 0.
Proof. Derivation of this equilibrium is identical to Proposition 1, except for
15
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the introduction of the boundary condition required to separate NEV claims
from PEV claims.
Remark. This is a semi-pooling equilibrium, as all types below the cutoff type
pool at A = 0. For all plaintiffs with PEV claims, however, this is the leastcost separating equilibrium and the optimality condition remains unchanged
from Proposition 1. For a separating equilibrium, optimality addresses the
marginal costs of additional signaling relative to the marginal benefits, and
the presence of NEV claims does not affect that condition for all types above
the cutoff type.
Remark. When the defendant holds all the bargaining power (i.e., α = 0),
the equilibria with and without NEV claims are the same. With α = 0, the
settlement for the cutoff type is zero in both scenarios.
Remark. A separating equilibrium requires that the cutoff type have zero
net payoff. For some sets of parameter values, this means that the cutoff
type spends as much on costly signaling as she expects to spend on discovery!
If signaling costs rise with type, then all types above the cutoff type would
spend more on signaling than they would spend on discovery.25 Obviously, no
plaintiff would choose costly signaling in this scenario unless—as Proposition 2
assumes—there is some cost to filing a lawsuit other than the cost of discovery
such that costly signaling may still be preferable to the alternative. Some
features of litigation practice, such as filing fees or pleading requirements, have
this effect. Any up-front cost (up to the amount of the cutoff type’s settlement)
simply replaces the endogenous, costly signaling of all plaintiffs with PEV
claims. For plaintiffs who would otherwise choose discovery, however, a filing
fee or pleading standard is an additional cost.
Still, the result that cutoff types may spend as much on signaling as they
would spend in litigation costs may seem implausible. It is worth noting that
this is a property of equilibrium only in a model with continuously distributed
types with certain parameter values.26 (Note that the simpler model in Section 2, which had discrete types, did not generate this result.) This is because
sequential rationality in the continuous-types model requires that a type infinitesimally lower than the cutoff type receive zero settlement, while the cutoff
type receives a settlement. This sharp discontinuity between virtually identical
types is why signaling costs are so high in the continuous-types model.
In this way, the continuous-types model can be understood as the “worstcase scenario” for costly signaling; a coarser distribution of types dramatically lowers the costs of signaling and raises the net payoff to the cutoff type.
Nonetheless, I will rely upon this model in Section 4 when I compare costly
signaling to settlement signaling and screening, so as not to stack the deck
25

Signaling costs may not rise with type, however. It is conceivable that not only marginal
costs, but also total costs, fall as type rises.
26
P
In particular, α (CP≥C
+CD ) .
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in favor costly signaling. As we shall see, even with continuous types, costly
signaling compares favorable to other mechanisms for settlement.
Illustration. To make these results more concrete, we must specify a cost
function for signaling. Given that signaling can take many forms, and that the
cost structure of litigation-related activity is understudied empirically, there is
no obvious form to use. For expositional purposes, I will throughout this paper
use a simple function—plaintiff’s signaling costs are inversely proportional to
type:
F (t, A) =

A
t

(5)

See Figure 4 for a comparison of signaling costs by type with and without
the presence of NEV claims, using this functional form. Further details appear
in the Appendix.27

3.3

Pooling Equilibria

Given that signaling may be quite costly, it is natural for one to ask whether a
separating equilibrium with costly signaling can be socially optimal. Perhaps
costly signaling through pleading is like an arms race—a socially costly dynamic that generates no advantage in equilibrium for any player. So far in this
paper, I have focused on separating equilibria, but it is possible to construct
equilibria where all plaintiffs, or all plaintiffs with PEV claims, send the same
signal and receive the same settlement. Would such “pooling” equilibria make
plaintiffs better off? Would they be socially optimal?
The answer to both of these questions is, in general, no. Pooling equilibria
may be inferior to separation, both in terms of its effect on primary behavior
(i.e., enforcement of the substantive law) and in terms of total litigation costs.
As for substantive law, plaintiffs with stronger and weaker cases will be treated
alike. Defendants who have caused small injuries or who are less blameworthy
will pay the same settlement as defendants who have caused large injuries or
who are more blameworthy. This defeats the aims of the substantive law,
whether deterrence, compensation, or so on.
27

For this illustration and other illustrations that follow, I choose t ∈ [0, 1], α = 0.5,
and CP = CD = 0.3. This can be interpreted as normalizing the stakes of the dispute to
1 and having type represent the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing at trial (and winning a
judgment equal to stakes). Litigation costs for the parties are each equal to 30 percent of
stakes, which is roughly in line with prevailing rates for contingency fees, as well as estimates
of total litigation costs from empirical studies on tort litigation. See, e.g., Black, Hyman,
Silver, and Sage (2008); Silver (2002). Entirely different numbers could be used of course,
and importantly, the shape and height of the curves will depend on the parameters chosen.
Qualitatively, though, the illustrations provided herein are representative of results within
a fair range of plausible parameter values.
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As for total litigation costs, the familiar result that pooling eliminates the
social costs of costly signaling does not obtain when the pooling equilibrium
still must separate NEV claims from PEV claims. Indeed, signaling costs may
rise, because incentive compatibility requires that the NEV type not gain from
mimicking the cutoff type. In a separating equilibrium, the cutoff type obtains
a settlement reflecting the strength of the weakest PEV claim, but in a pooling equilibrium among PEV types, the cutoff type receives a higher settlement
precisely because she is pooled with plaintiffs with stronger claims. As a consequence, lower types in the pool must increase their signaling in equilibrium,
even as higher types decrease their signaling. These two effects will not, in
general, offset. Because the marginal cost of signaling is (by construction)
higher for low types, the increased costs for lowest PEV types will be greater
than the decreased costs for the highest PEV types. In the Appendix, I provide further details of the conditions required for a pooling equilibrium, with
an illustration of how pooling in the presence of NEV claims can raise, rather
than lower, total expenditure on signaling.
It is possible, though, to construct a pooling equilibrium that includes some
or all plaintiffs with NEV claims, which would reduce the costs of signaling
(but also the social benefits). Only if all claimants are included in the pool
would the costs of signaling fall to zero. Doing this, however, also reduces
the social benefits of litigation to zero, because every claim, from the utterly
frivolous to the utterly compelling, receives the same settlement. Finally, a
zero-signal pooling equilibrium may be impossible if a defendant’s willingness
to settle with all comers means that the pool of plaintiffs with low-type claims
will endogenously grow in response to the opportunity for free money.
Of course, costly signaling is not the only way that plaintiffs of different
types can separate themselves. It remains to be determined whether costly
signaling is a superior means of separation than its alternatives, such as settlement offers that separate types (i.e., settlement signaling) or even going
directly to discovery and trial. In the following Section, I present a more
general model in which costly signaling, settlement signaling, and screening
may occur. In this setting, zero-signal pooling may endogenously arise, because plaintiffs choose to separate themselves not through costly signaling,
but through their settlement offers. In this setting, it may be both privately
optimal (for plaintiffs) and socially optimal not to engage in costly signaling. Nonetheless, costly signaling remains privately optimal under a range of
parameter values—and socially optimally under an even larger range.
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4

Comparison with Screening, Settlement Signaling, and Litigation

At this point, the skeptical reader should be wondering why, given the potentially high cost of costly signaling, this method of signaling would be empirically relevant. Above, I simply assumed that costly signaling is superior to
discovery for all types, but it is possible that the cost of higher types separating themselves from lower types may be so high that they prefer to conduct
discovery to eliminate the information asymmetry. Further, in real-world practice, there is nothing to prevent parties from employing settlement signaling
or screening strategies instead of costly signaling.
Thus, the potential empirical and policy relevance of the costly signaling
model turns on the following questions:
To what extent is costly signaling likely to emerge endogenously? In other
words, to what extent is costly signaling the payoff-maximizing strategy for
plaintiffs when plaintiffs and defendants can choose among costly signaling,
settlement signaling, screening, and litigation?
To what extent is costly signaling preferable to its alternatives from the
social planner’s perspective? In other words, if we want to design procedural
rules to reduce the social cost of dispute resolution, should the rules promote
costly signaling or one of its alternatives?
As I will show below, costly signaling may compare quite favorably to its
alternatives. Under plausible, empirically relevant conditions, we may observe
a mix of costly signaling, settlement signaling, and discovery. Below, I first
examine a model that incorporates costly signaling, settlement signaling, and
screening as settlement mechanisms that are selected endogenously by the
parties. I then explore potential policy implications.

4.1

An Expanded Model

To compare settlement mechanisms, I consider the model above, but with
slight refinements: after the plaintiff’s opportunity to send a costly signal, the
plaintiff then has the opportunity to offer a settlement. If the plaintiff does
not make an offer, then the defendant has the opportunity to make an offer. If
neither makes an offer or if the offer is rejected, the case proceeds to discovery.28
This sequencing prioritizes plaintiff’s preference, which reflects the fact that
the plaintiff chooses to initiate the legal dispute in the first place and is thus
the natural first mover. Also, I assume that plaintiff type is distributed such
that the distribution of types is strictly positive, continuous, and differentiable
28

Note that there is at most one offer made. This abstracts away from bargaining dynamics. This abstraction is necessary for the settlement signaling and screening models, but not
the costly signaling model.
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for its entire range [t, t̄]. To ensure that both costly signaling and settlement
signaling are possible, I assume that the fixed filing fee C0 is strictly positive.29
By sending a costly signal and then offering settlement, the plaintiff chooses
the costly signaling regime; by sending no signal and then offering settlement,
the plaintiff opts into the settlement signaling regime; if the plaintiff forgoes
making an offer and the defendant makes an offer, this selects the screening
regime; if neither party makes an offer, this selects discovery. Different plaintiffs may choose different settlement strategies. For each of the subgames, I
focus on the equilibrium identified in their separate treatments in the literature: for costly signaling, see Proposition 2 above; for screening, see Bebchuk
(1984); for settlement signaling, see Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Farmer
and Pecorino (2007). See Figure 6 for the game tree.
From this setup, it follows that, even if screening and going directly to
discovery are options, identifying the equilibrium path of the game will always
come down to a horse race between settlement signaling and costly signaling.
Proposition 3 states this result more precisely.
Proposition 3: Only Costly Signaling or Settlement Signaling Subgames Obtain in Equilibrium. Assume that a party who is indifferent
between settlement and proceeding to discovery will choose to settle, and a
party who is indifferent between making a settlement offer and accepting a
settlement offer will choose to make the offer.30 First, the parties will always
attempt to settle; they will never skip to discovery. Second, screening will
not arise in equilibrium. Thus, equilibrium will be characterized by costly
signaling, settlement signaling, or a mix of the two.
Proof. See the Appendix. The intuition is that skipping to discovery is always
dominated by settlement signaling, and any proposed screening equilibrium
will unravel. In any proposed screening equilibrium, high types who would
reject a screening settlement offer would choose to make a settlement offer of
their own. In turn, the optimal screening offer would be lower, which would
lead the types who would reject that offer to choose signaling instead, and so
on.
As noted above, without specifying how much signaling costs, one cannot
determine a priori whether costly signaling will be more or less costly than its
alternatives. To make the comparison of equilibria under settlement signaling
and costly signaling more concrete, I will illustrate the comparison using the
signaling cost function introduced earlier. I also assume that all plaintiffs must
incur a filing cost C0 equal to three-tenths of plaintiff’s discovery costs.31
29

As Farmer and Pecorino (2007) show, separating equilibrium in the settlement signaling
game with NEV types requires a fixed fee C0 , and as the discussion of Proposition 2 above
noted, separating equilibrium in the costly signaling game may require a fixed fee C0 .
30
These assumptions are merely to dispense with knife-edge scenarios.
31
As before, I assume that signaling costs are inversely proportional to type, each party’s
costs of discovery are equal to 30 percent of the stakes, and plaintiff’s type reflects plaintiff’s
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Figure 7 compares the costs of a settlement signaling equilibrium and a
costly signaling equilibrium. For costly signaling, the plaintiff’s costs are equal
to total costs. For settlement signaling, the total costs are higher than the
plaintiff’s costs, because costs arise when settlement offers are rejected and
both parties bear the costs of discovery (and potentially trial). In Figure 7, we
see that although the total costs of settlement signaling exceed the total costs
of costly signaling for all plaintiff types, most plaintiff types prefer settlement
signaling, which is (for them) less costly. (For a range of types above the cutoff
type, costly signaling is lower cost for the plaintiff than settlement signaling.)
In this example, we see a mix of costly signaling and settlement signaling
arise endogenously in equilibrium. And because settlement signaling entails
settlements being rejected in equilibrium, we would also observe a fraction of
cases proceeding to discovery (and potentially trial). This mix of settlement
strategies, which includes bargaining failure leading to trial, seems realistic.

4.2

Policy Implications

Is it possible to compare social welfare under costly signaling versus settlement
signaling? Roughly, yes. Both costly signaling and settlement signaling equilibria involve all plaintiffs with PEV claims obtaining settlements or expected
judgments commensurate with their type, while all plaintiffs with NEV claims
obtain nothing. So there is no difference in who obtains relief. Further, if bargaining power and litigation costs are equal between the parties, settlement
are exactly equal to expected judgments. In this scenario, transfers from defendants to plaintiffs are identical under costly signaling (which involves only
settlement) and settlement signaling (which involves a mix of settlement and
further litigation). From the point of view of enforcement of substantive law,
both of these settlement mechanisms perform equally well.
These mechanisms differ, however, in the quantity and distribution of litigation costs. As noted above, costly signaling involves the plaintiff spending
resources on signaling, but neither party bearing the costs of discovery or trial.
Conversely, the costs of settlement signaling are the costs to both parties of
discovery (and possibly trial). This has three implications for our normative
assessment of settlement mechanisms:
A misalignment between plaintiff ’s private incentive to choose a settlement
mechanism and the social objective of minimizing litigation costs exists so
long as bargaining power is split between the parties. When filing costs are
sufficiently low, such as the case illustrated in Figure 8, virtually all plaintiffs prefer settlement signaling to costly signaling, because it is lower cost
for them.32 Settlement signaling, however, imposes greater total costs than
probability of winning, which can be anywhere from zero to 100 percent.
32
Recall that costly signaling and settlement signaling generate the same settlements, so
the only factor in the plaintiff’s decision is cost.
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costly signaling. This misalignment of private cost and social costs can be
seen as a product of the defendant’s discovery cost being an externality from
the plaintiff’s perspective.33
If plaintiffs held all of the bargaining power, the choice between costly
signaling and settlement signaling would not be a concern, because a party
with all of the bargaining power captures the full surplus from settlement and
thus fully internalizes the social cost of discovery. It is not clear, however, that
this scenario is empirical relevant, or what policies might be implemented to
shift bargaining power in this way.
Policies that encourage costly signaling rather than settlement signaling could
lower the total costs of litigation. If our concern is to lower the total cost of
litigation, policies that shift the equilibrium from settlement signaling to costly
signaling could lower total costs. Filing fees and pleading standards are policy
tools that can accomplish this result. As noted above, raising the up-front cost
of litigation (so long as the cost is less than the cost of discovery for the cutoff
type) has no effect on plaintiff’s equilibrium costs, given costly signaling. But it
does raise plaintiff’s costs when choosing an alternative settlement mechanism.
Thus, raising the costs of filing, such that all plaintiffs shift from settlement
signaling to costly signaling, can lower total costs in all cases—even though
this policy change has no effect on how many lawsuits are filed or the size of
settlements paid by defendants to plaintiffs.
To illustrate, Figure 9 considers an environment with much higher upfront costs than Figure 8. When comparing the two figures, note that the
costs of costly signaling are unchanged ; so long as the filing requirement is
less than the costly signal of the cutoff type, the rise in filing costs has no
effect on equilibrium costs for costly signaling. But the higher fee now leads
all plaintiffs to select costly signaling rather than settlement signaling, thereby
lowering total litigation costs relative to the scenarios in Figures 7 and 8.
But a policy change that shifts the equilibrium from settlement signaling to
costly signaling raises plaintiff ’s costs even if it lowers total costs. While the
hypothetical policy illustrated in Figure 9 reduces total costs, plaintiffs as a
whole are worse off in the new equilibrium, because their private costs have
risen due to the switch from settlement signaling to costly signaling. Thus,
this improvement in net social cost does have distributional consequences.
Further, not every increase in up-front costs will reduce total costs for all
lawsuits. Imagine that the status quo is represented by Figure 8, and consider
a switch to an intermediate regime, such as Figure 7, with lower up-front costs
than Figure 9. Here, some plaintiffs, (in the range t ∈ [0.3, 0.52]) prefer costly
signaling. In this range, the switch to costly signaling lowers total costs. But
higher-type plaintiffs still prefer settlement signaling. For these types, the
33

This misalignment was not considered by the original settlement signaling and screening
models, as they assigned all of the bargaining power to the party choosing the settlement
offer.
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higher up-front cost has not only raised plaintiff’s costs, but total costs as
well.34 Thus, raising up-front costs will fail to lower total costs if it does not
induce a sufficiently large shift from settlement signaling to costly signaling. As
a practical matter, these results counsel caution when policymakers tinker with
things like pleading standards. The relationship between total litigation costs
and pleading standards (or filing fees) is not monotonic, and an intermediate
level of up-front costs may in fact be worse than either extreme.

5

Conclusion

This paper introduces a model of costly signaling. It applies to costly and
observable undertakings, such as the hiring of lawyers and the filing of a complaint, that plaintiffs can use to signal their private information to defendants,
and thereby induce settlement without the need for discovery. The costly signaling model presents an additional, alternative settlement mechanism comparable to the canonical models of settlement through screening (Bebchuk 1984)
and settlement signaling (Reinganum and Wilde 1986). Unlike those models,
however, costly signaling does not require strict assumptions about the nature
of the settlement bargaining process. The costly signaling model accommodates (without altering its central, qualitative results) extensions that allow
for spending on costly signals to offset spending later in litigation or for spending on costly signals to double as investments in the litigation, increasing the
value of plaintiff’s claim.
I apply the costly signaling model to study the normative implications of
raising filing fees and pleading standards. Perhaps counterintuitively, raising
filing fees or pleading standards may reduce the total costs of litigation without
reducing the number of lawsuits or the settlements obtained by plaintiffs. But
not surprisingly, raising the up-front costs of litigation lowers the net private
payoffs to plaintiffs.
Although this paper considers several extensions to the costly signaling
model and looks at its relationship to filing fees and pleading standards, this
paper is narrowly focused on information environments with one-sided private
information held by the plaintiff. How costly signaling operates in different
information environments, and how it interacts with other legal policies and
rules, remains to be explored.
34

If the up-front cost is a filing fee, this may constitute a pure transfer rather than a true
social cost. In this setting, the higher up-front cost raises plaintiff’s costs but not social
costs.
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A
A.1

Appendix: Extensions
Combining Costly Signaling with Cost-Sinking

In Hubbard (2016b), I consider a symmetric-information environment in which
spending by a plaintiff at the pleading stage is not a signal at all (information is
symmetric), but it allows the plaintiff to front-load costs that otherwise would
occur later in litigation. By spending money at the outset, the plaintiff sinks
costs, reducing the cost of proceeding to discovery and trial if the defendant
refuses to settle. Consequently, a plaintiff whose claim would otherwise be
NEV can create a credible threat to proceed to discovery and trial by sinking
some of the costs of discovery and trial up front, such that the plaintiff’s
expected judgment is no longer less than the remaining costs of litigation.
This model can easily be applied in the costly signaling context. Indeed, the
qualitative results of the cost-sinking model of Hubbard (2016b) and of the
costly signaling model in this paper remain unmodified. The only meaningful
change in the equilibrium is that the cutoff type is now a type with an NEV
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claim—she spends money up-front to reduce her remaining litigation costs and
thereby creates a credible threat to sue and obtains a positive settlement. All
types above the cutoff type spend money up front as well, although for PEV
types, the spending is purely for costly signaling purposes.

A.2

Combining Costly Signaling with Investment in Success at Trial

Another possibility is that up-front spending is neither a pure signal nor frontloading of costs, but expenditures that both affect the outcome at trial and
potentially signal case strength, where case strength is now a function of both
plaintiff type and up-front expenditure. As noted above, both Choné and Linnemer (2010) and Jeitschko and Kim (2013) explore aspects of this approach.
Incorporating observable investments in case strength into the apparatus of
my costly signaling model is fairly straightforward. Rather than treating type
as merely reflecting an exogenous level of case strength that also affects signal
cost, we now treat type as reflecting both inherent case strength and the cost of
supplementing case strength, such that type affects signal cost and the degree
to which expenditures affect the outcome at trial. The simplest approach is to
treat A as both a measure of signal strength and an input into case strength,
such that the expected value of a plaintiff’s claim (call this π(t, A)) depends on
both t and A. To reflect the fact that higher spending improves expected value
with diminishing returns, let πA (t, A) > 0, πAA (t, A) < 0, and πt (t, A) > 0 for
all t and all A. The cost function F (t, A) retains all of its properties from
before.
Under these conditions, we can construct a separating PBE with the optimality
condition
FA (t, A∗ (t))

dA∗ (t)
dA∗ (t)
= 1 + πA (t, A∗ (t))
dt
dt

(6)

The left-hand side of Equation (6) reflects the marginal cost of increasing the
signal A for type t. This is unchanged from the original optimality condition,
Equation (1). What has changed in the right-hand side, which now reflects
this increase in settlement amount from mimicking a marginally higher type
(same as before) but also the marginal increase in settlement amount from the
plaintiff’s case actually being stronger, due to the higher up-front investment.
When there are no NEV claims, the boundary condition reflects the fact that
the lowest type in equilibrium cannot benefit from signaling, but is still willing
to invest in up-front cost to improve case strength. Its expenditure is identical
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to the solution to the optimization problem without private information:
FA (t, A∗ (t)) = πA (t, A∗ (t))

(7)

When there are NEV claims, the boundary condition is determined by a pair
of equations reflecting that (1) the cutoff type is determined endogenously,
because case strength is determined endogenously, and (2) the payoff to the
cutoff type must be zero. Thus, the signaling schedule A∗ (t) and cutoff type τ
are such that the cutoff type is the lowest type who would proceed to discovery
in the absence of settlement:
π(τ, A∗ (τ )) − CP = 0

(8)

and the payoff to type τ in the separating equilibrium is zero:
S(A∗ (τ )) − F (τ, A∗ (τ )) = 0

(9)

Figure 10 illustrates the graphical solution to this problem, showing A∗ (t).

A.3

Pooling Equilibria: Conditions and Examples

For simplicity, assume equal bargaining power and equal discovery costs, such
that settlements (if type is common knowledge) are equal to expected judgments. Assume that beliefs about out-of-equilibrium signals are such that
unraveling will not occur.
For pooling of PEV claims at signal AP ool and settlement S P ool to be an equilibrium, it must be that (1) all pooled plaintiffs prefer settlement at S P ool to proceeding to discovery; (2) the defendant prefers settlement at S P ool to proceeding to discovery; and (3) no NEV plaintiffs have an incentive to mimic the signal AP ool . Condition (1) requires that no plaintiff with a PEV claim gain more
from settlement than from skipping to discovery: S P ool − F (t, AP ool ) ≥ t − CP
for all t ≥ CP . Condition (2) requires that defendant’s settlement payment not exceed the expected cost from settlement or trial after discovery:
S P ool ≤ E[t|t ≥ CP ] + CD . Condition (3) requires that the net payoff to the
cutoff type be zero: S P ool = F (CP , AP ool ).
From Conditions (1) and (3), we see that this pooling equilibrium can only
obtain if the costs of signaling fall sufficiently fast in t: it must be that
F (CP , AP ool ) − F (t, AP ool ) ≥ t − CP for all t ≥ CP . Depending on the cost
function F for signaling and the distribution of plaintiff types, it is possible to
27
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construct a pooling equilibrium that meets these conditions.
To continue the illustrative example used above, consider a unit mass of
plaintiffs with types uniformly distributed in the interval t ∈ [0, 0.9], with
CP = CD = 0.3, α = 0.5, and F (A, t) = A/t. The unique pooling equilibrium
that meets the three conditions above has S P ool = 0.9 and AP ool = 0.27, which
implies F (t,
AP ool ) = 0.27/t. Total litigation costs (borne entirely by plainR 0.9
tiffs) are ( 0.3 (0.27/t)dt)/(0.67) = 0.445. By comparison, the total litigation
R 0.9
costs of a separating equilibrium are ( 0.3 (t/2 + CP2 /2t)dt)/(0.67) = 0.344.35
One could also construct a pooling equilibrium in which all plaintiffs, including
some or all NEV plaintiffs, pool. Such an equilibrium would need to comport
with Conditions (1) and (2) above, but not Condition (3). This pooling equilibrium could be reduce total litigation costs to zero, since there is no separation
between NEV and PEV claims. The example above also has a unique pooling equilibrium in which all plaintiffs pool: S P ool = 0.6 and AP ool = 0. The
defendant is indifferent between settling with all plaintiffs or proceeding to
discovery with only the plaintiffs with PEV claims, the highest-type plaintiff
is indifferent between settlement and proceeding to discovery, and all other
plaintiffs are strictly better off. Total litigation costs are zero.

B

Appendix: Proofs and Notes

B.1

Derivation of Equilibrium in Proposition 1

The equilibrium concept is PBE. Both the equilibrium concept and the equilibrium I describe are standard for models of this type. Define pt (A) to be
the probability that a plaintiff of type t chooses pleading level A. Define rt (S)
to be the probability that plaintiff of type t rejects settlement offer S. Define
β0 (t) to be the defendant’s prior belief of the probability that a plaintiff is of
type t, and define β(t|A) to be the defendant’s posterior belief of the probability that a plaintiff is of type t given observed pleading detail level A. A
PBE is a settlement offer schedule {S(A)} from the defendant, a set of (possibly mixed) strategies {pt (A), rt (S)} for the plaintiff’s types t, and conditional
beliefs β(t|A) of the defendant such that
1. The making, acceptance, and rejection of settlement offers in any period
are consistent with each party maximizing expected payoffs.
2. All signals A observed in equilibrium must maximize the plaintiff’s expected payoffs.
35

See Appendix Section B.2 for derivation of the equilibrium cost function for the separating equilibrium in this example.
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3. The defendant’s posterior beliefs β(t|A) must satisfy Bayes’ Rule whenever pt (A) > 0. There are no restrictions on beliefs when pt (A) = 0.36
Based on these conditions, we can identify the following PBE:
Settlement offers and responses. The defendant offers S(A∗ (t)) = t + αCD −
(1 − α)CP . Offers are always accepted.
Signaling strategy. The only challenge in identifying the separating PBE in
this model is deducing the equilibrium signaling schedule A∗ (t) such that each
type reveals itself by sending a unique signal and no type can increase its
payoff by mimicking the signal of a different type. The payoff to type t that
mimics type j and receives the equilibrium settlement for type j is
U (t, A∗ (j)) = j + αCD − (1 − α)CP − F (t, A∗ (j))

(10)

For separation to be an equilibrium, each type t must maximize their payoff
by sending the signal that reveals their own type:
t = argmax{j + αCD − (1 − α)CP − F (t, A∗ (j))}

(11)

j

From this, the first order condition, Equation (1), follows.37
Equation (1) is a differential equation reflecting the optimality condition for a
separating equilibrium—each type t maximizes her payoff by sending a signal
A∗ (t) that uniquely corresponds to type t. Plaintiffs’ equilibrium signaling
strategy A∗ (t) is therefore given by Equation 1 and the boundary condition,
Equation (2), which reflects the fact that the lowest type need not signal at
all.
Posterior beliefs. The beliefs in this equilibrium are β(t|A∗ (t)) = 1 and
β(t|A∗ (j)) = 0 for all j =
6 t.38
While there are many PBEs that one may propose, I will focus on the equilibrium described above, as it has intuitively appealing properties. This equilibrium is the “least-cost separating equilibrium,” the unique, pure-strategy,
separating equilibrium that minimizes the social cost of costly signaling. This
equilibrium is also the only PBE in this model that also satisfies the Cho-Kreps
36

In defining equilibrium concepts in this model, including PBE and least-cost separating
equilibrium, I follow the approach to the Spence (1973) model provided by Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005).
37
Note that given the definition of F (t, A), the second order condition will always be met.
38
Note that it is easy to verify that settlement offers and acceptances are sequentially
rational and defendant’s posterior beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
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Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987).

B.2

Derivation of Equilibrium Costs in the Illustrative
Example

Assume that plaintiff’s signaling costs are inversely proportional to type as
noted in Figure 5. Given this, the optimality condition (see Equation (1)) for
a separating PBE is
1 ∗ 0
[A (t)] = 1
t

(12)

For the case without NEV claims, this together with the boundary condition
in Equation (2) implies

A∗ (t) =

t2 t2
−
2
2

(13)

and thus in equilibrium

F (t, A∗ (t)) =

t
t2
−
2 2t

(14)

This cost function is used to generate the lower curve in Figure 4. The lowest
type plaintiff sends no signal, and each plaintiff with a PEV claim obtains a
settlement t + αCD − (1 − α)CP ; under the assumptions used in Figure 4, the
settlement is simply t.
For the case with NEV claims, Equation (12) together with the boundary
condition in Equation (4) implies

A∗ (t) =

t2 CP2
+
2
2

(15)

and thus in equilibrium

F (t, A∗ (t)) =

t CP2
+
2
2t

(16)

This cost function is used to generate the upper curve in Figure 4 and the
costly signaling curves in Figures 7 through 9.
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B.3

Proof of Proposition 3

First, the parties will always attempt to settle. Skipping to discovery is dominated by both settlement signaling and screening; the party making the offer
at least weakly prefers (by construction) the equilibrium settlement offer to
discovery. For example, in the settlement signaling equilibrium in Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) (which involves no NEV types), all types strictly prefer
making a settlement offer to litigation. In Farmer and Pecorino (2007) (which
allows for NEV types), all PEV types strictly prefer making a settlement offer
to litigation, except for the cutoff type, who is indifferent.
Second, screening will not arise in equilibrium. Proof is by contradiction.
Assume that some subset of plaintiffs (possibly all plaintiffs) forgo making
a settlement offer. Call the distribution of such plaintiffs f (t) and call the
highest type for which f (t) is positive b. Note that for plaintiffs of type b to be
in f (t), they must strictly prefer their payoffs under screening to their payoffs
otherwise. This implies that all plaintiffs of type t < b will forgo making
settlement offers, because payoffs under both costly signaling and settlement
signaling are non-negative in type.39 Thus, it follows from the assumptions
for the distribution of all plaintiffs that f (t) is also continuous, differentiable,
and positive for all plaintiff types up to b.
For these plaintiffs, the defendant will then make a screening settlement offer
that maximizes defendant’s expected payoff, taking into account the cost of
paying settlements to all plaintiffs who accept the offer and the cost of paying
judgments and litigation costs when plaintiffs reject the offer. First, assume
that the distribution of plaintiffs is degenerate, i.e., a measure-zero set composed only of one type (b). Defendant’s offer in this case will be S = b − CP ,
which is exactly what type b obtains at trial. This is a contradiction; in this
case type b will choose to make a settlement offer, since the payoff from making a settlement offer for type b will be no worse than the payoff from going
to discovery. Second, assume a non-degenerate distribution of plaintiffs f (t),
but a measure zero of PEV plaintiffs in f (t). If so, the defendant will offer a
screening settlement of zero. (The defendant gains nothing by settling NEV
claims.) Given a strictly positive cost of filing suit, the NEV plaintiffs will
have a negative payoff from filing suit. This is a contradiction; they will not
file suit and therefore will not participate in the screening subgame.
Thus, it must be the case that there is a positive measure of plaintiffs with PEV
claims. If so, for these claims, the solution to this optimization problem (for a
distribution f (t) of plaintiffs that is continuous, differentiable, and positive for
39

This can be confirmed by differentiating with respect to type the plaintiff’s payoff function under either costly signaling or settlement signaling. For costly signaling, note that the
payoff to a plaintiff of type t is t + αCD − (1 − α)CP − F (t, A∗ (t)). For settlement signaling,
see Reinganum and Wilde (1986).
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all plaintiff types up to b) is characterized by Bebchuk (1984).40 Proposition
1 of Bebchuk (1984) shows that the optimal screening offer will always be one
such that some plaintiff types will reject the offer.
In other words, type b plaintiffs will never accept a screening settlement offer;
they are certain to go to discovery. All type b plaintiffs, therefore, will choose
to make a settlement offer, since doing so is no worse than the payoff from
going to discovery (and for all types above the cutoff type, it is strictly better).
This is a contradiction; by assumption the subset of plaintiffs f (t) who forgoed
making a settlement offer contained plaintiffs of type b. QED.
40

Note that Bebchuk (1984) addresses the scenario when the defendant has private information, so its Proposition 1 should be read with this in mind.
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Figures
Figure 1: Separating Equilibrium with Costly Signaling
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A

Figure 2: Separating Equilibrium with Heightened Pleading
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A

Figure 3: Separating Equilibrium with Ultra-Heightened Pleading
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A

Figure 4: Costs of Costly Signaling for CP = CD = .3 and α = 0.5, with and
without NEV Claims
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Figure 5: Spending on Costly Signaling with Signal Strength Capped at Ã
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Figure 6: Game Tree for Expanded Game
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Figure 7: Costs of Settlement Signaling and Costly Signaling for CP = CD =
.3, α = 0.5, NEV Claims, and minimum signal C0 = 0.09
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Figure 8: Costs of Settlement Signaling and Costly Signaling for CP = CD =
.3, α = 0.5, NEV Claims, and minimum signal C0 = 0.03
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Figure 9: Costs of Settlement Signaling and Costly Signaling for CP = CD =
.3, α = 0.5, NEV Claims, and minimum signal C0 = 0.3
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Figure 10: Equilibrium Signal Function with Endogenous Investment in Success at Trial
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